In the past few years, American political discourse has increasingly conflated the ideas of democracy and constitutional republicanism, and it is not difficult to see why given the many appeals to save our democracy from impending doom. The call to protect our democracy has been echoed by politicians, pundits, the media and celebrities alike. Nevertheless, the underlying assumption that the United States is a democracy has been challenged by many. They argue America is a constitutional republic and note that the word “democracy” is not found in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights. So, which is it: is America a democracy or a republic?
Why does it matter?
The founders were explicit and deliberate in characterizing the United States as a republican form of government, not a democracy. In The Federalist Papers, James Madison distinguishes between both forms of government. A republic, he says, is “a government in which the scheme of representation takes place,” whereas as democracy is “a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person.” He explains that democracies, which feature rule by the majority, are prone to factionalism and tyranny and are therefore inimical to individual rights and the public good:
A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.[i]
This was neither hypothetical nor hyperbole. Madison had in mind the “turbulent democracies of ancient Greece” that had at times resulted in mob rule and a more recent example in Shay’s Rebellion, which had brought the young United States to the brink of collapse and was one of the main catalysts of the constitutional convention.[ii] An important object of the framers was to secure liberty while ensuring it did not lead to a state of anarchy “adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”[iii]
A relief in republicanism
The founders proposed republicanism as an antidote to the vagaries of democracy. This was not a new idea at the time of the constitutional debates. In The Republic, Plato points to the pitfalls of democracy, namely its tendency to lead to tyranny, lawlessness, and violence, which are in need of some moderating influence.[iv]
In his Politics, Aristotle contends that government by the people and by the few each have strengths and shortcomings but could lead to tyranny if pursued in the extreme. He says, “a free state is indeed nothing more than a mixture” of oligarchy and democracy, either by blending the laws of each, finding a medium of their laws, or adopting the best laws of each system.[v] “The middle state is therefore best,” he explains, “as being least liable to those seditions and insurrections which disturb the community.”[vi]
Cicero concurs nearly 300 years later in his work The Republic: a mixed constitution that is “well tempered and balanced” is the most suitable to a free people because it combines the best parts of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy:
Now we are struck first with the great equability of such a constitution, without which a people cannot be free long; next with its stability. The three other kinds of government easily fall into the contrary extremes: as a master grows out of a king; factions from the better class; and mobs and confusion from the people. The changes too are perpetual which are taking place. This cannot well happen in such a combined and moderately balanced government, unless by the great vices of the chief persons.[vii]
Similarly, in The Spirit of Laws, a major inspiration to the framers of the U.S. Constitution, Montesquieu notes that excessive democracy can lead to a “spirit of extreme equality, which leads to despotic power” through conquest.[viii] He instead exhorts his readers to find middle ground between democracy and aristocracy by resorting to a system of checks:
Democratic and aristocratic states are not in their own nature free. Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and even in these it is not always found. It is there only when there is no abuse of power: but constant experience shews us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say, that virtue itself has need of limits?
To prevent this abuse, it is necessary, from the very nature of things, power should be a check to power. A government may be so constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from things which the law permits.[ix]
Understanding full well the exigencies of their time and circumstance, the framers set out to create a system of checks and balances capable of separating and restraining the power of government while maximizing liberty to the extent possible.
The Senate as a modulating influence
The Connecticut Compromise was one of their solutions, uniting the democratic spirit and aristocratic values in the bicameral legislature. Under this framework, congressional representation is proportional to state population and delegates have a more direct tie to the people they represent and by whom they are elected. Senators, on the other hand, who were originally elected by the state legislatures, were to have higher qualifications and serve longer terms because their trust required “greater extent of information and ability of character.”[x] Madison explains that the Senate is also designed to stabilize the government and guard against the impulses and tumult of the public body:
The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.[xi]
Montesquieu says a senate must “serve as a rule and pattern of manners,” “naturally inspire every family with sentiments of virtue,” and “adhere to the ancient institutions, and mind that the people and the magistrates never swerve from them.”[xii] This resembles Aristotle’s notion of an ideal aristocracy that embodies virtue and honor.[xiii]
The United States is not a democracy
Although the United States has democratic characteristics, it is not a democracy, and that is so by design. But this has not stopped politicians from declaring otherwise. Some acknowledge that the United States is not a pure democracy but insist it is a variety of such, akin to those Aristotle describes in Politics.[xiv] They claim America is a “representative democracy,” but even this is a misnomer, because it reverses the genus of government, republicanism, and its species, democracy, confounding modifier and modified. Moreover, it deemphasizes the system’s mixed constitutionalism, which blends democracy and aristocracy in the bicameral Congress.
This is more than just a matter of semantics or accident; the push to rewrite the power-sharing formula has had real-world consequences in the last 100-plus years. As Montesquieu and Madison warned, the shift toward democratic majoritarianism has disequilibrated constitutional checks and balances by centralizing political power and eroding individual rights.
17th Amendment undermines bicameralism and separation of powers
Perhaps one of the most significant blows to constitutional republicanism came from the 17th Amendment. Supported by progressive William Jennings Bryan and the Populist Party, the amendment transferred the ability to elect senators from the state legislatures to the people, removing an important check on federal power. Madison explains the benefits of the former system:
It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems.[xv]
The link severed, the Senate is no longer beholden to the states but to special interests. It is no more the cool, detached body it was designed to be. Rather, it is subject to the whims of a capricious mob and therefore does not have the moderating influence on populist passions it once did.
Though ostensibly a win for individual liberty by expanding the suffrage of citizens, the 17th amendment in fact subjects voters to the tyranny of a national government that has grown beyond its intended bounds and is no longer accountable to the states it is designed to represent.
National plebiscite undermines federalism and republicanism
The founders saw the electoral college as an important and noncontroversial measure to maintain federalism, state sovereignty, and republicanism while protecting against tyranny of the majority. Alexander Hamilton describes it in the following terms:
The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded. I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.[xvi]
Hamilton envisions the Electoral College exercising a moderating influence on the wild passions of the public. He notes that it will comprise “men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation,” like members of the Senate. Moreover, he explains how the body will operate as a check against tyranny of the majority. While it maintains the spirit of republicanism and affords states a voice proportional to their state population, “The choice of several, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of one who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes.”[xvii]
Efforts to abolish the Electoral College in favor of a national plebiscite threaten to undercut the delicate system of checks and balances, the separation of powers, and the compromise between states of varying sizes and demographics. The reasons to preserve the Electoral College are manifold and far outweigh any advantages to be gained from its removal.[xviii] Most importantly, the system emphasizes the public good over the will of the majority and tempers political extremes by forcing presidential candidates to win nationwide support beyond just urban population centers. It also ensures stability by reducing the likelihood of recounts and fraud.
Conclusion
Proponents of democratic majoritarianism are — whether unknowingly or by design — subverting the principles of mixed constitutionalism on which the United States was founded. It is not democracy that needs saving; rather, it is constitutional republicanism that needs to be protected from the encroachments of an increasingly immoderate democracy that threatens to sacrifice the public good at the altar of passion and impetuosity. Those who appreciate the elaborate system of checks and balances that have sustained republican government in the United States for nearly 250 years would do well to reevaluate the contemporary political climate and efforts to recast the United States as a democracy in this context.
[i] James Madison, “The Federalist Papers, No. 10,” The Avalon Project (Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp.
[ii] ———, “The Federalist Papers, No. 14,” The Avalon Project (Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed14.asp.
[iii] Madison, “The Federalist Papers, No. 10.”
[iv] Plato, “The Republic of Plato,” Project Gutenberg (Oxford University Press, July 26, 2017), Book VIII, 557-563, https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/55201/pg55201-images.html.
[v] Aristotle, “Politics: A Treatise on Government,” Project Gutenberg (J M Dent & Sons Ltd. , October 1, 2004), Book IV, Chapter IX; Book IV, Chapter VIII, https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/6762/pg6762-images.html#link2HCH0051.
[vi] Ibid., Book IV, Chapter XI.
[vii] Cicero, “The Republic of Cicero,” Project Gutenberg (G. & C. Carvill, February 12, 2017), Book I. XLV, https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/54161/pg54161-images.html#II.
[viii] Montesquieu, “The Complete Works of M. De Montesquieu, Vol. 1.,” Online Library of Liberty, accessed September 8, 2024, Book VIII, Chapter II, https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/montesquieu-complete-works-vol-1-the-spirit-of-laws.
[ix] Ibid, Book XI, Chapter IV.
[x] James Madison, “The Federalist Papers, No. 62,” The Avalon Project (Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed62.asp.
[xi] Ibid.
[xii] Montesquieu, Book V, Chapter VII.
[xiii] Aristotle, Book IV, Chapters VII-VIII.
[xiv] Ibid., Book IV, Chapter IV.
[xv] Madison, “The Federalist Papers, No. 62.”
[xvi] Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist Papers, No. 68,” The Avalon Project (Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed68.asp.
[xvii] Ibid.
[xviii] Hiram Fong et al., “Minority View on the Direct Popular Election of the President,” Teaching American History, August 14, 1970, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/minority-view-on-the-direct-popular-election-of-the-president/.
